Stopping payment fraud before money moves
Business email compromise and vendor impersonation target AP teams every day. Here's how Slingstone builds defenses into the workflow itself.
2 min read · Slingstone
Where fraud gets in
Most payment fraud doesn't hack a bank. It persuades a person: an email that looks like it's from a known vendor, asking to update bank details before the next payment. Legacy AP tools usually treat a bank change as an ordinary field edit.
Separation of duties, enforced
In Slingstone, the person who approves a bill can't release its payment. Payment release is always a human action, and AI identities are blocked from it at the platform level.
Bank changes are a controlled event
Vendor bank details are masked in the application and held in a secure vault. Any change triggers a verification step that a person must complete before the new details can be used, and suspicious requests are held automatically.
Inbound email checks
Slingstone checks the sender of every inbound document and flags look-alike domains — the classic one-character swap — before the message reaches a reviewer.
An audit trail you can prove
Every approval, change and release is written to a hash-chained audit log, so the history can't be quietly altered after the fact.
Legacy tools vs. Slingstone
| Legacy tools | Slingstone |
|---|---|
| Bank details are an editable field | Bank changes require verified human approval |
| Approver can often release | Approver and releaser must be different people |
| Email accepted at face value | Look-alike sender and domain detection |
| Editable activity logs | Tamper-evident, hash-chained audit log |